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EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Richard Edwardst
INTRODUCTION
The future of employee participation plans ("EPPs") in the
United States can only be understood within the context of the
ongoing demise of our contemporary industrial relations system.
That system, sometimes called the postwar system, relied on
two principal mechanisms: collective bargaining, which is now
highly marginalized, and statutory regulation, which has proven
to be extremely ineffective. The "free market," however, also is
unlikely to be a viable alternative. Hence, the future of EPPs
may be as clouded as that of the larger industrial relations
system.
In order to be successful, a new system of industrial rela-
tions must provide employers with enough flexibility to be
competitive in a global market, while simultaneously protecting
the fundamental interests of workers. Employee participation
plans may become an important part of our new system of
industrial relations. If they do, they most likely will provide
only one element of a complex web of labor relations that will
exist with several different, perhaps overlapping systems. The
development of this new situation renders obsolete our tendency
to use a "one-size-fits-all" mentality in labor law and mandates
that we begin serious consideration of alternatives to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act framework.
In Part I of this essay I discuss the collapse of the postwar
system of industrial relations. In Part II I consider elements of
the new system that likely will emerge from the collapse of the
postwar system. Finally, in Part III I suggest a method by
which employment participation plans may be incorporated into
our new system of industrial relations.
1 The author, an economist, is Dean of Arts and Sciences at the University
of Kentucky and the author of, most recently, RIGHTS AT WORK EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS IN THE POST-UNION ERA (1993).
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I. THE COLLAPSE OF THE POSTWAR SYSTEM
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The postwar system of industrial relations rested on the
twin pillars of collective bargaining and statutory regulation.'
An implicit capital-labor accord developed and, for a generation,
offered a model for industrial governance. Corporations
achieved the flexibility to introduce new technologies needed to
develop their businesses, while collective bargaining and statu-
tory regulations advanced workers' incomes and interests.2
Unfortunately, the face of industrial relations has changed. The
decline of the unions weakened the collective bargaining pillar,
and ineffectiveness and burden undermined regulation, the
second pillar. As a result, the postwar system no longer pro-
vides an effective mechanism for regulating industrial relations.
Unions became highly marginalized players in the first
pillar of collective bargaining, which is based in the private
sector. In 1992, the union share of non-farm, private sector
employees was only 12.7%.' This means that in 1992, seven
out of eight private sector employees were outside the collective
bargaining framework. Simply to maintain that share of em-
ployees, unions would have to recruit enough new members to
keep up with the growth in the employed labor force (perhaps
1.5% per year), as well as compensate for normal attrition in the
union sector (around 3% per year), and replace lost members
through decertification efforts (less than 1% per year).4 Overall,
unions would have to enroll approximately 500,000 new mem-
bers each year just to maintain their present, anemic share.
In 1992, all unions combined won a total of 69,113 new
employees though the election process established by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.5 Unfortunately, decertification
elections initiated by employers during 1992 deprived unions of
1 Some would add a third: high-employment macroeconomic policies.
2 For a discussion of the postwar capital-labor accord, see RICHARD
EDWARDS & MICHAEL PODGURSKY, The Unraveling Accord: American Unions
in Crisis, in UNIONS AND CRISIS AND BEYOND: PERSPECTIVES FROM Six
COUNTRIES (Richard Edwards et al. eds., 1986).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 241, 245 (1993).
4 See id.
' N.L.R.B. Representation & Decertification Elections Statistics (BNA)
Tables 1 & 2 (June 1993).
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19,245 members.6 Accordingly, the net addition was only
49,868 new members - one-tenth of the number needed to
maintain their current share. The figures from 1992, though
worse than prior years, was not unrepresentative: during the
preceding four years, unions won an annual average of only
67,259 net new private sector members - a tiny fraction of
their "replacement" needs.7 These results simply extend a slide
in union share that began in the mid-1950s; in fact, the last
time unions won as many as one half-million new private sector
members was 1953.8 Richard Freeman rightly called this
shrinkage "the effective de-unionization of most of the U.S.
labor force."9
The second pillar of the postwar system, statutory regula-
tion, also is deficient, although some regulation clearly is effec-
tive and beneficial. While the Occupational Safety and Health
Act' aids in disseminating information and raising conscious-
ness about job safety, it fails to achieve its ultimate objective of
making the workplace safe. It is highly unsuccessful in reduc-
ing fatalities and job-related injuries." Similarly, the Employ-
ee Retiremenf Income Security Act'2 brings some benefits,
such as early vesting of pensions. However, with respect to its
regulatory operations, it is difficult to discern substantial
benefits for workers, as contrasted with accountants, lawyers,
and corporate profiteers.'" In a similar vein, a recent analysis
6 id.
7Id.
8 NLRB ANN. REPS. (1953-92).
9 Richard Freeman, Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of Private
Sector and Public Sector Unionism in the U.S., 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 65 (1988).
10 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
11 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health
Regulation, 1973-1983, 7 RAND J. ECON. 567 (1980).
2 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
13 For a discussion of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's
failings, see RICHARD EDWARDS, RIGHTS AT WoRK: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN
THE POST-UNION ERA, 113-17 (1993). The Act is designed to safeguard the
pensions of workers enrolled in private-employer pension plans. Employers
who do have pension plans must administer them in accordance with certain
standards and must register such plans with the Labor Department. Howev-
er, the Act is long, complicated, and presents a system that only highly
specialized experts can understand. The costs of administering and register-
ing pension plans are extremely high. Thus, an unintended side-effect of the
Act is that it may deter employers from starting pension plans and may even
1994]
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of the 1988 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act'4 found that the implementation of this law resulted in
almost no increase in notification of workers. Indeed, "the
.major change in notice apparently took the form of shifting
workers from informal notice to no notice at all.'
15
The record of regulation, especially workplace regulation, is
remarkably bare of beneficial changes to workers at the shop-
floor or job-site level. Workers' advocates enjoy more power in
Washington, D.C. and the nation's statehouses than they enjoy
in factories and offices. This creates the peculiar situation in
which democratic forces can impose new regulation that is
irritating and burdensome to employers but not very helpful to
workers.'6
II. THE NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
The collapse of the postwar system of industrial relations
system does not necessarily herald a return to an unregulated
free labor market. In order to be successful, a new system of
industrial relations must both provide employers with the
flexibility they need to compete in a dynamic economy and
protect the fundamental interests of employees. In other words,
a successful system must provide a framework for industrial
relations that fosters some degree of union-management cooper-
ation.
The parties involved have misunderstood both parts of this
relationship. Unions and workers' advocates often misperceive
the need for employer flexibility, which all parties agree results
in employer abuse of power if granted in the extreme. For
example, in the 1930s, foremen in the Ford plants had the
power to fire workers on the spot - an exercise not of "employ-
er flexibility" but of industrial tyranny. 7 Nonetheless, after
induce employers to abandon them.
14 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988).
" See John T. Addison & McKinley L. Blackburn, The Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 187 (1994) (noting
that from 1983-1988, before the implementation of the Act, workers had a
47.5% chance of receiving no notice. With the Act's implementation in 1991,
that percentage increased to 53.0%).
16 Republicans then capitalized on the real burdens created. This curious
impasse helped revitalize the Republican Party but failed to create a record of
benefits for workers.
17 It was a tyranny that, in my judgment, lives on in the doctrine of
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witnessing the recent down-sizing of GM and IBM, the success
of teaming at Toyota, and the dynamism of the new high-tech
industries such as software or biotechnology, who can doubt
that employernflexibility is an essential ingredient for modern
industrial survival? Unions that advocate systems of industrial
relations that do not permit such employer flexibility are mis-
guided, because they are consigning their enterprises to stagna-
tion and loss.
Alternatively, employers and business advocacy groups
often misunderstand the second part of the relationship, the
protection of workers' interests. Presumably, workers' primary
interests are reasonably secure employment at adequate wages
in safe working conditions with decent treatment by manage-
ment and some opportunity for occupational or professional
advancement. Employers argue that the free market provides
adequate protection for these basic interests. Although the free
market will play a part in the new system of industrial rela-
tions, our society never has accepted for long the idea of mar-
kets as the final arbiter of labor conditions. A return to the
unregulated market is no more likely than is a revival of the
postwar system of industrial relations."8
To what extent can employee participation plans provide
employers with the flexibility they need to compete in a dynam-
ic economy while simultaneously protecting the fundamental
interests of individual employees? In the face of the collapse of
the postwar system, employee participation may become an
important part of a new industrial relations system. However,
it will be only a part of that system, and our thinking about
employee participation plans must be geared toward ascertain-
ing how they will fit into the larger regime.
The new industrial relations regime likely will consist of
several distinct or parallel sub-systems. These sub-systems will
not neatly partition the economy into separate sectors. Rather,
"employment at-will."
1 8 SAMUEL BoWLEs & HERBERT GINTIs, DEMOCRACY AND CAPrALIsM:
PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL
THOUGHT, 3-27 (1986) (noting that modem society is governed by both the
rules of capitalism and the rules of democracy, in a changing dialectic of
conflict and accommodation. The postwar capital-labor accord was a specific
institutional accommodation between the rules of capitalism and the rules of
democracy, and its unraveling can be traced to the underlying dynamism of
both). For a discussion of the erosion of the postwar system, see EDWARDS &
PODGURSKY, supra note 2, at 14-60.
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they will overlap and intertwine in regulating different aspects
of the employment relationship. These sub-systems will include
private-economy unions, unionized public sector employment,
civil service, a casual ("sweat-labor") sector, non-union employ-
ment, and national and state regulation. This system also is
likely to include a much-enhanced definition of individual rights
in the workplace."
The new industrial relations regime likely will include other
elements as well, but my point is that it will be highly diverse.
Any tendency to use a "one-size-fits-all" rule to organize all
labor relations will be counterproductive. Unfortunately, it is
precisely this procrustean mentality that dominates current
labor law.
III. EPPs AND THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
A consideration of the future of employee participation
schemes should anticipate the context of rapid transformation of
the overall system of industrial relations. A discussion of the
value of employee participation only in terms, for example, of its
relation to unions, or to current National Labor Relations Act
rules, surely is far too narrow an approach. While I doubt if
anyone wants to see employee participation become another
weapon employers might use to defeat unionization, the fact is
that, for the overwhelming majority of private-sector workers,
unionization simply is not likely to be at issue.20 We should,
for example, think about the recent decision in Electromation,
Inc. 21 from a broader perspective: how can we situate employee
participation so as to contribute to a new and effective industri-
al relations regime?
This broad approach carries important implications for
EPPs. First, a successful resolution of the legal and political
issues must be acceptable to employees as well as to employers.
This outcome corresponds to the long-term interests of employ-
19 For further discussion of this theory, see EDWARDS, supra note 13.
Recent legal developments will produce some important changes in this area
of the employment structure. In my judgment, if the courts are left to define
and supervise these rights, the results, from an industrial relations perspec-
tive, will be very unfortunate, especially since superior alternatives are
possible.
20 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
21 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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ers, because the alternative appears to be increased regulation.
Second, significant employee participation for seven out of eight
private sector workers should not be held hostage to the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act-derived bargaining rights of the one out
of eight workers represented by unions. Third, the National
Labor Relations Board is not the proper venue for these deci-
sions, and courts are equally bad; rather, this is preeminently a
legislative issue. Fourth, we probably need different sets of
rules about employee participation for different employment
situations.
Probably the most promising and challenging path to
effective labor relations is to use the openings created by demo-
cratic forces in our society to create systems, including employee
participation, that reproduce or mimic the collective bargaining
framework. The original operation of the National Labor
Relations Act was stimulative and permissive; it required or
stimulated some actions, such as bargaining in good faith, and
permitted diverse final outcomes, such as the content of the
contract. The Act fostered decentralized agreements tailored to
the specific circumstances of the industry, employer, and work-
ers involved.
In RIGHTS AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE POST-
UNION ERA,22 I provide an example (that of employees'
workplace rights) of ways to avoid the one-size-fits-all formula-
tion. The "Choosing Rights" proposal would utilize employee
handbooks to guarantee rights to employees, while preserving
maximum flexibility for employers. The basic idea is simple.
Every firm over a threshold size, for example, twenty employ-
ees, would be required by statute to have an employee hand-
book, or handbooks, stating the rights and privileges extended
to the firm's employees. This handbook would be distributed to
employees and job-seekers and would be on record as a public
document. It would be recognized in law as a binding and.
enforceable employment contract.
An employer could adopt a handbook in one of two ways.
First, the employer simply could choose and implement a "stan-
dard" handbook. For this purpose, a special public-private
commission would be chartered to develop a set of perhaps ten
or more prototype handbooks. Each handbook would provide
basic workplace protections and rights while offering a distinc-
' For a more detailed discussion of this proposal see EDWARDS, supra note
13, at 188-230.
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tive and diverse combination of specific rights. Each type of
handbook would provide a common, overall level of protections
while offering its own distinctive mix of rights. Thus, for
example, regarding employment security, one handbook might
offer substantial severance pay, while another permitted dis-
missal for just cause only. A third might guarantee continued
employment over a specified period and include the possibility
of reduced hours or pay if the company sustained a loss. The
employer could choose whichever standard handbook was most
compatible with its enterprise's circumstances or philosophy.
Alternatively, the employer could write its own, specially-
tailored handbook, which could be put into effect if the firm's
employees ratified it. This option would allow the employer to
specify those conditions, rules, terms, procedures, and rights the
employer believed would be most helpful to the enterprise.
Beyond the employer's knowledge that the handbook could be
put into effect only upon the employees' approval, no restrictions
would be placed on what the employer included or omitted from
the handbook. Approval would be implemented by a simple
National Labor Relations Board-supervised election asking
workers to choose between the employer's tailored handbook
and one of the standard handbooks selected by the employer.
Thus, while free to write any specific provisions, the employer
would be required to make its total package more attractive to
its employees than at least one of the standard handbooks. On
the other hand, the most adverse outcome for the employer
would only be the imposition of the standard handbook the
employer otherwise would have chosen.
Under "Choosing Rights," the locus of rules and rights
formulation would move away from regulatory bureaucracies
and into the decentralized private sector. It would allow for
greater flexibility on the part of employers. Thus, the system
would permit infinite variations in workplace protections,
consistent with the extraordinarily diverse nature of American
workplaces. This variation and flexibility could accommodate
the diverse demands of various management philosophies,
regional customs, production technologies, workplace cultures,
and market conditions. It also would ensure basic workplace
protections for workers. The employer's handbook in effect
would become the workers' bill of rights.
Implementing "Choosing Rights" would call for further
operational considerations. For example, one standard hand-
book could be designated as the "default" option; it would
prevail in workplaces in which a recalcitrant employer, after a
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reasonable period, failed to promulgate a handbook by either of
the methods outlined above. The system would require rules
about when and how an employer could change handbooks. In
addition, enforcement procedures would need to be defined. It
would be highly desirable to have available an independent
arbitration service that emphasized getting disputes resolved
quickly, simply, inexpensively, legitimately, and with the aim of
getting the parties back to working together.
This new approach might open significant new opportuni-
ties for unions. "Choosing Rights" would not directly enhance
the unions' ability to win over new plants for which they would
be the exclusive bargaining agents. However, it would offer
unions new ways to work on behalf of individual employees,
thereby indirectly increasing unions' fields of operation. For
example, unions could provide advice and assistance to indi-
vidual workers in non-union plants concerning resolution of
their grievances, they could lend their expertise to workers in
writing employee handbooks, or they could assist workers in
mediation and arbitration proceedings. Each of these opportuni-
ties might give greater substance to the concept of associational
unionism, and unions could find their memberships growing
outside of the National Labor Relations Act framework. It also
would be surprising if, after having tended successfully to the
interests of individual workers, unions did not find themselves
in a stronger position to seek exclusive bargaining agent status.
CONCLUSION
In charting a course for the socially beneficial use of em-
ployee participation plans, we should follow an approach similar
to that outlined above for "Choosing Rights." The introduction
of stimulative but permissive rules to encourage employee
participation -just as the National Labor Relations Act sought
to encourage collective bargaining - would expand the possibili-
ties for constructing an effective, new type of industrial system.
The framework of the National Labor Relations Act is desirable,
but its approach is not. Adjudicating the limits of employee
participation plans through the Act's lens, as in Electromation,
makes no sense.
Appropriate regulation of employee participation plans,
then, would allow for substantial, firm-specific diversity. For
example, regulation could provide standards for accountability
and independence. Employers would decide whether to imple-
ment such plans. If they chose to do so and thereby obtained
1994]
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the productivity benefits of a more engaged and committed labor
force, they would need to abide by simple guarantees of
representativeness and accountability. Rather than attempting
to resuscitate the old National Labor Relations Act system, or to
impose further "one-size-fits-all" substantive regulation,
workers' advocates could choose between various methods
depending on the specific purpose and circumstances of the
intervention. To borrow from the old adage about British
national interests, labor's advocates should have no permanent
strategy, only permanent interests. Perhaps then we would see
real progress concerning employee participation.
